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TRACEY E. GEORGE*
Is the federal judiciary truly an independent body? A quick glance at the
Constitution would suggest the answer is yes. The Constitution provides for life
tenure and a difficult removal process for federal judges that together, as the
common wisdom goes, shield federal judges from the shiing winds of the more
political branches and the public at large. The author of this essay argues,
however, that on a closer examination of the protections provided for by the
Constitution, judicial independence might be more mirage than truism. Threats
to judicial independence arise not only externally through the actions of the
other bodies of the federal government, but just as importantly, from within the
judiciary itself The author focuses on these internal threats to judicial
independence.
First, judges are the children of an inherently political process: Judges are
nominated by presidents, who by necessity must be political in their selection of
judges, and the resulting confirmation process in the Senate is often a delicate,
and sometimes brutal, political affair. The author proposes that judicial
independence may be best served by divided government checking and balancing
itself in the appointment process. Second, judges are often political creatures.
They, as with most humans, have their own ideologies and ambitions, and the
constitutional structure designed to maximize judicial independence may have
the opposite effect of amplifying their political behavior. The author concludes
that despite its flaws, Article III's judicial system is still a model system of
dispute resolution.
I. INTRODUCTION
All Article H judicial officers-United States Supreme Court justices, court
of appeals judges, district court judges, and judges of the Court of International
Trade-are selected by the Article II appointment and confirmation process
reserved for "officers" of the nation and are granted Article 1H salary and tenure
protections. 2 These provisions were, and are, considered the source of judicial
independence that, in turn, is the hallmark of the judicial office as constructed by
the United States Constitution? These structural protections were designed to
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University.
Article II empowers the president, "with the Advice and Consent of the Senate" to
appoint U.S. Supreme Court justices as well as other "Officers of the United States." U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
2 Article III grants to judges life tenure, limits removal to the impeachment process, and
promises undiminished salary that is paid from the national treasury. U.S. CONST. art. I1, § I.
3 Consider Hamilton's arguments in The Federalist Papers:
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insulate judges from the political process and the attendant pressure to please
constituents that would interfere with fair, unbiased decisionmaking. Federal
judges can make, and have made, unpopular decisions with very little risk of
being run out of office. At the most fundamental level, Article II does create an
independent judiciary.
Judicial independence, however, must mean more than freedom from
dismissal by Congress, the President, or the citizenry. It should include an
independence from the politicization of the other two branches-a neutrality in
decisionmaking. 4 This broader concept of judicial independence is not clearly
reflected in the federal judicial structure, even if it is manifested in the individual
decisions ofjudges.5
Article MI does not ensure an autonomous judiciary because its protections
are inherently ambiguous. The very features of the federal judicial system that
provide independence from the political process may also allow for great judicial
partisanship. Article mH relieves judges of the direct demands of popular election
and the uncertainty of service at the pleasure of the executive or legislative
branch, but Article II exposes the judicial system to external and internal threats
to its autonomy. The external threats arise from powers that the Constitution
leaves to Congress and the President to control the judiciary's resources and
If, then, the courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited
Constitution against legislative encroachments, this consideration will afford a strong
argument for the permanent tenure of judicial offices, since nothing will contribute so
much as this to that independent spirit in the judges which must be essential to the faithful
performance of so arduous a duty.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). "Next to
permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the judges than a
fixed provision of their support." THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 472 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 453-55 (1969) (explaining the development of the idea of a judiciary
independent from the legislature and the people).
4 Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 464, 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (arguing that life tenure "is the best expedient which can be devised in any government to
secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws").
5 Many types of judges work in the federal system. For example, under its Article I
authority, Congress has empowered administrative law judges and agency-based arbiters to
decide disputes. Bankruptcy judges and magistrate judges operate within the Article III judicial
system but are not chosen by the Article II appointment process and serve for a term of years.
These decisionmakers handle a large and growing caseload, but do not enjoy Article III's
protections. The question of the independence of non-Article III federal judges is important but
beyond the scope of this article.
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structure, 6 the courts' jurisdiction,7 and the enforcement of their rulings.8 The
internal threats come from the judges themselves: Ideology and ambition can
undermine their neutrality.
The internal threats to judicial independence are more subtle but no less
potent than the external threats. The constitutional provisions that create the
judicial system also expose it to partisanship in its functioning. Article II allows
substantial politicization of the means of appointment that, in turn, can produce
political judges. Article III affords judges the opportunity to decide cases entirely
based upon ideological preferences that are typically aligned with the positions of
identifiable parties or groups. Moreover, lower federal court judges often harbor
ambition to obtain higher office (including appointment to a higher federal court),
and Article III does not restrain judges from using their participation in cases to
lobby informally for appointment.
6 For example, judges still must worry about Congress refusing to raise their salaries or
provide sufficient staff support. Article III promises job security, but some of the most basic
characteristics of any employment-compensation, daily workload--are still within the
control of the other two branches of government. Congress may not decrease judges' salaries;
however, it can refuse to increase salaries leading to a decline in real earnings. See, e.g., Admin.
Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Pay Question Arises in Supreme Court Budget Hearing,
THIRD BRANCH, Mar. 2002, at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/mar02ttb/questions.html (reporting
Justice Anthony Kennedy's comment in a Senate hearing that Article IIn judges felt "frustration
and disappointment... at having been specifically denied four different COLAS when all other
members of the government, save Congress, received it"); Admin, Office of the U.S. Courts,
Insecure About Their Future: Why Some Judges Leave the Bench, THIRD BRANCH, Feb. 2002,
at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/feb02ttb/feb02.html. State courts have ordered state legislatures
to increase salaries in response to inflation. For a discussion, see Adrian Vermeule, The
Constitutional Law of Official Compensation, 102 COLuM. L. REv. 501 (2002); Adrian
Vermeule, The Judicial Power in the State (and Federal) Courts, 2000 SUP. CT. REv. 357,
382-87.
7 See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441, 449 (1850) (holding that "having a right to prescribe,
Congress may withhold from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the enumerated
controversies. Courts created by statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute
confers."). An extensive scholarly debate has been waged over the exact nature and bounds of
Congressional authority over federal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, A Different
Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and Federal Jurisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. I
(1990); Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court 1980 Term, Foreword: Constitutional
Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95
HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981); Martin H. Redish & Curtis E. Woods, Congressional Power to
Control the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New Synthesis, 124
U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1975); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction
of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953).
8 Hamilton emphasized the relative weakness of the judicial branch in the Federalist
Papers: "[The judiciary] may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL but merely
judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy
of its judgments." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
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George W. Bush's failed initial nomination of Charles Pickering to fill a
vacancy on the Fifth Circuit in the Democrat-controlled 107th Congress offers a
good example of the limitations of Article 1f.9 The Pickering nomination was the
Bush administration's first outright failure in the judicial appointment process. In
his first two years in office, Bush named 101 judges (17 court of appeals, 83
district court, and 1 court of claims judges), or more than 12% of the Article III
judiciary.10 Bush nominated 131 individuals, gi~ving him a 77% success rate. 11
Clinton appointed six more lower court judges during his first two years in office,
but Clinton enjoyed unified government dining the entire period.' 2 Bush
appointed nearly twice as many district judges as his father, who also faced
divided government, appointed in his first two years in office. 13
9 The Senate Judiciary Committee also rejected Bush's nomination of Texas Supreme
Court Justice Priscilla Owen to fill another vacancy on the Fifth Circuit. Joan Biskupic,
Democrats Defeat Bush Appeals Court Nominee: Senators Cite Texas Judge's Opinions on
Abortion, Workers, USA TODAY, Sep. 6, 2002, at 7A. With Republicans again in control of the
Senate, Bush renominated both Owen and Pickering. Mike Allen & Charles Lane, President
Renominates Miss. Judge, 29 Others, WASH. PosT, Jan. 8, 2003, at A01.
President Clinton also had some difficulties appointing judges to the Fifth Circuit during
divided government. Clinton appointed five judges to the circuit in his first term, but none in his
second term. When Clinton left office, two of seventeen seats on the Fifth Circuit had been
vacant for more than three years and another seat for more than one year. Admin. Office of the
U.S. Courts, Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary, at http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/
judgevacancy.htm#05 (last visited Nov. 19, 2002). For a discussion of Clinton's efforts to name
judges to fill these vacancies, see Statement of Senator Patrick Leahy on Judicial Nominations,
Dec. 11, 2001 at http://1eahy.senate.gov/press/200112/121101b.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2003).
10 See U.S. Dep't of Justice Office of Legal Policy, Judicial Nominations, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/judicialnominations.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2002) (detailing G.W.
Bush's nominations); Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Vacancy Summary, at
http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/summary.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2002) (listing the
number of Article III judges). Bush's 101 judicial appointments constitute 12.6% of the 802
active Article III judges. U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Nominations Statistics, at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/nominations.cfm (current as of Nov. 20, 2002) [hereinafter
Nominations Statistics].
I I Nominations Statistics, supra note 10. By comparison, the Democrat-controlled Senate
confirmed 90% of Clinton's nominees during Clinton's first two years in office. When
Republicans had control during the next two years, Clinton's success rate fell to 70%. Sheldon
Goldman et al., Clinton's Judges: Summing Up the Legacy, 84 JUDICATURE 228,233 (2001).
12 Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Selection Under Clinton: A Midterm Examination, 78
JUDICATURE 276, 279 (1995). When Clinton faced a divided government during the second half
of his first term, the Senate confirmed only sixty-two of' his nominees. Sheldon Goldman &
Elliot Slotnick, Clinton's First Term Judiciary: Many Bridges to Cross, 80 JUDICATURE 254,
255 (1997).
13 See Sheldon Goldman, The Bush Imprint on the Judiciary: Carrying on a Tradition, 74
JUDICATURE 294, 295 (1991) (reporting that President George H.W. Bush appointed one
Supreme Court justice, eighteen circuit judges, and forty-eight district judges in his first two
years as president).
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Charles Pickering seemed to the casual observer a near certainty for
confirmation to the circuit bench: He had served for twelve years as a district
judge in Mississippi, he was rated "well-qualified" by the American Bar
Association, his son is a Congressman from a state within the Fifth Circuit, and he
is a personal friend of Senator Trent Lott. 14 Bush contemporaneously sought to
promote another district judge to the Fifth Circuit, Edith Brown Clement, who
was confirmed within two months.15 But, interest groups and congressional
representatives moved against Pickering based on a number of issues, significant
among them his record as a district court judge.16 Judge Pickering's published
decisions have been decidedly conservative on civil rights and civil liberties
issues. 17 The Senate Judiciary Committee leadership used the nomination as a test
of their Democratic colleagues' resolve to block Bush nominees deemed
unacceptable by their supporters. 18 The Committee vote was along straight party
lines, ten opposed and nine in favor. The nomination died when the membership
refused to send Pickering to the full Senate for a vote.
Although only one nomination, the Pickering case offers insights to the
potential effects of partisanship on the federal judiciary. Protected by life tenure,
District Judge Pickering was free to pen controversial opinions that hewed closely
to an identifiable political perspective. His conservative decisions undoubtedly
contributed to the Bush Administration's decision to recommend him for the Fifth
Circuit, but those decisions ultimately prevented his promotion to a higher court.
Ideological appointment battles led to Pickering's defeat.
This article focuses on the internal threats to judicial independence of Article
Ell judges. Part H examines the judicial selection process because it is this process
that often leads to the selection of partisan judges and influences the behavior of
judges who aspire to promotion to a higher court. In Part II, I argue that divided
14 See Paul Kane, Bush Pressed on Nominees: GOP Senators Urge Public Push for
Judges, ROLL CALL, Sept. 10, 2001, at A-I; Neil A. Lewis, Fight Over Judicial Nominees
Resumes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6,2002, at A16.
15 See Fed. Judicial Ctr., Judges of the United States Courts, at http://air.fjc.gov/
history/judges firm.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2003).
16 See, e.g., Alliance for Justice, Report: The Case Against the Confirmation of Charles
W. Pickering, Sr., to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit (Jan. 24, 2002), at
http://www.alliancefoj ustice.org/judicial/researchpublications/researchdocuments/pickering
full report.pdf; Congresswoman Eddie Bernice Johnson, News Release: Johnson Urges
Senate Judiciary Members to Vote Against Pickering Nomination, Mar. 5, 2002, at
http://www.house.gov/ebjohnson/030502pickeringstatement.htm (statement by Chair of
Congressional Black Caucus).
17 See, e.g., Citizens' Right to Vote v. Morgan, 916 F. Supp. 601 (S.D. Miss. 1996) (ruling
that federal courts should allow state courts to resolve voting rights disputes); Fairley v. Forrest
County, 814 F. Supp. 1327 (S.D. Miss. 1993) (criticizing the one-person one-vote doctrine). Of
course, Pickering's ninety-nine published rulings constitute a small fraction of his decisions.
18 See Neil A. Lewis, Panel Rejects Bush Nominee for Judgeship, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15,
2002, at A l.
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government may be the best protection of judicial independence as it ensures the
division of power promised by. the Article II appointment process. Part III
considers the lack of Article Ili constraints on judges-and the relative lack of
review of judicial decisions-which means that federal judges may pursue their
own ideological agenda within certain limitations. The evidence of ideologically
motivated judges serving in the federal courts is set forth in Part I. Part IV
reviews the effect of the possibility of promotion on judicial behavior. The article
concludes in Part V by considering whether the federal judiciary still deserves its
status as the benchmark of judicial independence.
II. JUDICIAL SELECTION
The federal bench has 843 Article III judgeships.19 A judicial vacancy occurs
when an active judge takes senior status, resigns, retires, dies, or is impeached, or
when a statute creates a new judgeship.20 The President nominates an individual
to fill the vacant seat, and the Senate either confirms or rejects, expressly or
effectively through inaction, the nominee. 21 Once appointed, federal judges can
only be removed from office by impeachment.22 Therefore, judicial selection is
the only formal mechanism for direct control over the individual decisionmakers
19 Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Vacancy Summary: Authorized Judgeships, at
http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/summary.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2002).
20 Congress last established new judgeships in 1990. The United States Judicial
Conference has asked Congress to add six permanent and four temporary judges to the courts of
appeals and twenty-three permanent and twenty-three temporary judges to the district courts as
well as converting ten temporary district judgeships to permanent posts. Admin. Office of the
U.S. Courts, Judicial Conference Urges Action on Quiet Crisis of Too Few Judgeships, THIRD
BRANCH, June 2002, at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/june02ttb/judgeships.htr1.
21 Article II dictates that "[the president] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate .... shall appoint... Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers
of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which
shall be established by Law." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
22 Federal judges, who serve during "good Behavior," may only be removed from office
by impeachment for "Treason, Bribery, and other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." U.S.
CONST., art. III, § 1, art. II, § 4. Impeachment is very rare, and conviction even more so, on all
levels of the judiciary. Only one justice has been impeached (Samuel Chase in 1804) out of the
108 who have served, and no justices or courts of appeals/circuit judges have been convicted.
Fed. Judicial Ctr., Impeachments of Federal Judges, at http://air.fic.gov/history/topics/
topicsji-bdy.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2002) (listing all impeachments including an
impeachment and conviction of a U.S. Commerce Court judge in 1913). Eleven district court
judges have been impeached, and six have been convicted, out of 2383 judges who have served
on the district bench. Id.; Fed. Judicial Ctr., History of the Federal Judiciary,
http://air.fjc.gov/history/judgesfrm.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2003) (searchable database that
allows user to find all judges satisfying certain criteria including court). In fact, district court
judges may seem more at risk for removal than they are because three district court judges were
convicted and removed from office in the 1980s.
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in the third branch. Not surprisingly, then, the political branches use this
opportunity to serve various ends, including party patronage and policy goals.
Historically, strategic goals, such as party influence or legislative logrolling,
dominated selection, but today policy priorities drive the President's efforts to
staff the federal bench as well as the Senate's willingness to confirm.
A. Presidential Nomination
Presidents since Washington have been cognizant, to varying degrees, of the
import of federal judges to public policy, but this concern was often outweighed
by competing pressures to satisfy members of Congress or party activists when
choosing judges.23 Presidents, in fact, look almost entirely to their own party for
appointments to the federal bench despite pleas from various quarters for
bipartisan-or apolitical-appointment. 24 As reflected in Table 1, FDR almost
never looked outside the Democratic Party for judicial appointments: Only six of
his 192 appointments were not Democrats (or 3%). Gerald Ford's appointment
rate of 78% Republicans is the closest to bipartisanship, and Ford, of course, was
acting in the shadow of Watergate. Both parties have demonstrated comparable
party favoritism: From FDR's first term through Clinton's last, 91% of
Democratic appointees have been Democrats and 92% of Republican appointees
have been Republicans.
The selection of Supreme Court justices always demanded some degree of
presidential attention and allowed greater presidential discretion.25 Presidents,
recognizing the policymaking role of justices, have sought to appoint individuals
23 See generally SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT
SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN (1997) (offering a brief review of the lower
court appointment process under Presidents Washington through Hoover along with a detailed
account of the nomination politics in the administrations of Franklin Roosevelt through
Reagan); KERMIT L. HALL, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE (1979).
24 See, e.g., GOLDMAN, supra note 23, at 157 (discussing the ABA's push for bipartisan
appointments in the 1950s).
25 See generally DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS
AND THE SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES (1999) (describing post-WWH presidential
selection of Supreme Court nominees); see also Montgomery N. Kosma, Measuring the
Influence of Supreme Court Justices, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 333, 333, 336 (1998) (drawing an
analogy between "a financial manager selecting a capital investment" and "a president choosing
a Supreme Court nominee" and developing "an economic model of the nominee as an
investment"); Bryon J. Moraski & Charles R. Shipan, The Politics of Supreme Court
Nominations: A Theory of Institutional Constraints and Choices, 43 AM. J. POL. Sdi. 1069
(1999) (examining the conditions under which presidents can make strategic nominations).
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Table 1. Political Party Affiliation of Judicial Appointees 26
President Democrats Republicans Other or No Percentage from
Appointed Appointed Affiliation Own Party
FDR 186 5 1 97%
Truman 117 10 0 92%
Eisenhower 10 166 0 94%
JFK 113 11 1 90%
LBJ 160 9 0 95%
Nixon 15 213 0 93%
Ford 13 51 1 78%
Carter 230 13 15 89%
Reagan 14 344 13 93%
Bush 10 166 11 89%
Clinton 321 23 24 87%
whose politics most closely resemble their own.27 Truman, for example, sought to
appoint close, loyal friends to the high court because he believed they would be
more likely to defer to his efforts to control the economy.28 Modem presidents
have focused on particularly salient issues in. their policy agenda, including
criminal procedure, 29 abortion,30 and civil rights. Various judges have reported
26 District Court and Court of Appeals appointments drawn from GOLDMAN, supra note
23, at 277; Sheldon Goldman et al., Clinton's Judges: Summing Up the Legacy, 84 JUDICATURE
228,244 tbl.3, 249 tbl.6 (2001); Sheldon Goldman, Bush's Judicial Legacy: The Final Imprint,
76 JUDICATURE 282, 287, 293 (1993). Supreme Court appointments drawn from LEE EPSTEIN
ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM 318-20 (1996).
27 See HERMAN SCHWARTZ, PACKING THE COURTS: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO
REWRITE THE CONSTITUTION 42-149 (1988) (offering a brief historical account of judicial
selection from 1793 through 1980 and a more detailed consideration of Ronald Reagan's
successful and failed nominations to the bench, and observing that Reagan was certainly not
unique in his effort to alter the constitutional landscape through judicial appointments); JEFFREY
A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATrITUDINAL MODEL 127
(1993) ("Given the Supreme Court's role as a national policy maker, it would boggle the mind
if Presidents did not pay careful attention to the ideology and partisanship of potential
nominees."); Goldman, supra note 13, at 295-97, 306 (discussing how Reagan and Bush
sought to appoint judges to carry out their social agenda, namely, "institutionalizing judicial
restraint in matters of govemmental civil liberties and civil rights policymaking," just as
Roosevelt and Truman aimed to appoint judges to "consiitutionaliz[e] the New Deal").
28 See YALOF, supra note 25, at ch. 2.
29 Nixon campaigned for the White House by promising to overtum the Warren Court's
rulings favorable to broad defendants' rights. He sought law-and-order judges who would do
just that. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 9-16, 253-55 (1999);
JOHN W. DEAN, THE REHNQUIST CHOICE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE NIXON APPOINTMENT
THAT REDEFINED THE SUPREME COURT 41 (2001) (examining, based on his own perspective as
a White House insider and on a review of Nixon tapes, Nixon's selection of Supreme Court
justices and confirming that "[l]aw and order toughness topped the list"). While serving on the
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being questioned at length by administration officials, and in some instances by
the President himself, about their positions on various substantive matters as well
as their general judicial philosophy.31 For example, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
reported that President Reagan personally asked her position on abortion, a
central issue on Reagan's agenda.32
Only more recently have presidents turned as much attention to the selection
of lower court judges.33 Franklin Roosevelt was the first to focus on selection of
lower court judges, after he concluded that the courts of appeals and district courts
were significant in his battle to protect and enforce New Deal legislation.34 FDR
D.C. Circuit, Warren Burger wrote an article favoring a tougher stance on criminal procedure
that Nixon both praised and cited in his own campaign. ABRAHAM, supra, at 255; DEAN, supra,
at 12-13. Nixon elevated Burger to the Supreme Court's top spot with his first appointment.
Nixon, however, did not focus solely on policy goals in judicial selection. He also wanted to
strengthen his political position, hoping for example to build support in the South by selecting a
southerner for the Court. ABRAHAM, supra, at ch. 3. For a discussion of Nixon's success in
appointing justices who would thwart the Warren Court's criminal rights revolution, see Yale
Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was It Really So Defense-Minded?), The Burger Court (Is It
Really So Prosecution-Oriented?), and Police Investigatory Practices, in THE BURGER COURT:
THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 62 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983).
30 See, e.g., Timothy B. Tomasi & Jess A. Velona, Note, All the President's Men? A Study
of Ronald Reagan's Appointments to the US. Courts of Appeals, 87 COLuM. L. REV. 766
(1987).
31 See, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 44 (5th ed. 1995) (describing how
both Harry Blackmun and Sandra Day O'Connor were questioned at length as to their positions
on various policy issues by presidential aides prior to nomination); DEAN, supra note 29, at 23
(reporting Nixon's private meeting with then-Seventh Circuit Judge Harry Blackmun);
GOLDMAN, supra note 23, at 296-307 (describing efforts by the Reagan Administration to
ensure that lower federal court candidates "shared the administration's judicial philosophy").
But see DEAN, supra note 29, at 214-19 (recounting the generally bland telephone conversation
between Nixon and Lewis Powell prior to Nixon's nomination of Powell).
32 See ABRAHAM, supra note 29, at 284; BAUM, supra note 31, at 44; DAVID G. SAVAGE,
TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST SUPREME COURT 114 (1993) (reporting that
O'Connor told Reagan that she was personally opposed to abortion and believed states should
have the power to regulate it).
33 For an examination of nineteenth century nomination practices, see Richard D.
Friedman, The Transformation in Senate Response to Supreme Court Nominations: From
Reconstruction to the Taft Administration and Beyond, 5 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (1983); Kermit L.
Hall, The Children of the Cabins: The Lower Federal Judiciary, Modernization, and the
Political Culture, 1789-1899, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 423 (1980). One notorious early episode of
lower court packing was the Midnight Judges Bill of 1800 in which the lame-duck Federalist
President and Congress sought both to broaden the jurisdiction of the district and circuit courts
and to fill the newly created circuit judgeships with Federalists in an effort to limit the power of
the incoming Jeffersonians. See RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 34 (4th ed. 1996).
34 GOLDMAN, supra note 23, at 30-31 (explaining that presidents before Franklin
Roosevelt did not devote attention to lower court appointments, but F.D.R.'s administration
devoted significant resources to nominations); Rayman L. Solomon, The Politics of
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concluded that the individuals best able to do so were those who had
demonstrated their intellectual support of, and belief in, his programs. But, the
policy focus waned and presidents returned to a patronage view of district and
circuit judgeships. Kennedy and Johnson, for example, expressed an interest in
the civil rights positions of lower court candidates, but ultimately made their
decisions based on a desire to satisfy certain interests and allies. 35
Jimmy Carter, who campaigned as a party outsider, brought the process into
the public eye to a far greater extent than any president before or since. While he
did not name a single Supreme Court justice, Carter named more trial and
intermediate appellate court judges (258) in his single term in office than any
prior Administration, due in part to the creation of 152 new Article III judgeships
in the Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978. Carter chose courts of appeal nominees
from recommendations made by the U.S. Circuit Judge Nominating Commission,
an organization created by Carter and modeled after the merit selection
commission he used as Georgia governor.36 He also encouraged senators to create
local commissions to vet district court nominees, but he did not go so far as to
remove senatorial power over the district court process. Carter claimed that the
panels would prevent the influence of party patronage; however, Commission
members were chosen in part based on party connections, 37 and nearly all of
Carter's nominees were Democrats (see Table 1).
Ronald Reagan did the most to orchestrate a judicial selection system that
included close involvement of the White House and careful consideration of
policy and political goals, particularly for appellate court candidates. Reagan, like
Appointment and the Federal Courts' Role in Regulating America: US. Courts of Appeals
Judgeships from TR. to F.D.R., 1984 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 285, 342-43.
35 See generally ABRAHAM, supra note 29, at 207--22; GOLDMAN, supra note 23, at 154-
97.
36 Exec. Order No. 11,972, 42 Fed. Reg. 9659 (Feb. 14, 1977), 3 C.F.R. 96 (1978); Exec.
Order No. 12,059,43 Fed. Reg. 20,949 (May 11, 1978), 3 C.F.R. 180 (1979) (establishing U.S.
Circuit Judge Nominating Commission). For a discussion of the Commission, see Elliott E.
Slotnick, The US. Circuit Judge Nominating Commission, I LAW & POL'Y. Q. 465 (1979).
President Reagan, shortly after his inauguration, revoked President Carter's Executive Order of
May 11, 1978, thereby terminating the Commission. Exec. Order No. 12,305, 46 Fed. Reg.
25,421 (May 5, 1981), 3 C.F.R. 150 (1982).
37 The panels did not consider party activism as part of the selection process. Elliott E.
Slotnick, What Panelists Are Saying About the Circuit Judge Nominating Commission, 62
JUDICATURE 320, 322 (1979) (relating panelist survey responses indicating "prior political
activity appeared to be [a] relatively unimportant concern[]"); cf LARRY BERKSON ET AL., A
STUDY OF THE U.S. CIRCUrr JUDGE NOMINATING COMMISSION: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 20
(1979) (reporting that most candidates who responded to their survey indicated they had not
been active in party politics during the previous five years). The Justice Department, however,
selected many panel members based on their party support. Id. at 3 (paraphrasing a "high
ranking official involved in selecting panel members" who stated "it was 'very important' to the
White House for prospective panelists to have been members of the Democratic Party, active in
party causes, and early Carter supporters.").
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FDR, viewed the federal judiciary as crucial to his policy proposals and also
looked for candidates sharing his judicial philosophy-which reinforced his
policy agenda-for appointment to the appellate bench.38 Reagan made a
campaign promise to appoint judges reflecting his ideology.39 And, the
Administration's selection system largely achieved that end.40 Reagan's judicial
appointment decisions have had far-reaching political consequences. Studies of
Reagan-appointed judges reveal that they utilized their gate-keeping control to
close the courthouse doors to disadvantaged plaintiffs (but not advantaged
ones).41 The direct result was to foreclose courts as an avenue of redress for
subordinated groups. The indirect result was to limit their access to the political
system because such coalitions have little influence with the elected branches.
Reagan has not been unique in his efforts to impact policy by way of judicial
appointments, but he has been one of the more successful presidents in this
regard, aided by six years of a Republican-controlled Senate.
Bill Clinton used his appointments to name liberal to moderate judges who
appeared to vote consistently with his "New Democrat" agenda.42 Conservatives
38 See GOLDMAN, supra note 23, at 307 (concluding, based on a review of available
presidential papers, that "at least 75 percent of [Reagan's] appeals court judges were policy-
agenda appointments"); SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 5, 68-69 (describing the "model Reagan
[appellate court] nominee" as "a young, intellectually strong academic with little trial or other
legal experience, with strongly held ultraconservative views based on an economic model");
Sheldon Goldman, Reagan's Second Term Judicial Appointments: The Battle at Midway, 70
JUDICATURE 324, 333 (1987) (positing that the Reagan Administration nominated "scholars
[who] had a track record of published works so that their judicial philosophy could be discemed
by administration officials").
39 The GOP Platform stated that Reagan intended to appoint conservative judges who held
"the highest regard for protecting the rights of law-abiding citizens" and "the belief in the
decentralization of federal government and efforts to return decision-making power to state and
local elected officials." Gary Fowler, Judicial Selection Under Reagan and Carter: A
Comparison of Their Initial Recommendation Procedures, 67 JUDICATURE 265,267 (1984); see
also Sheldon Goldman, Reaganizing the Judiciary: The First Term Appointments, 68
JUDICATURE 313,315 (1985).
4 0 Robert A. Carp et al., The Voting Behavior of Judges Appointed by President Bush, 76
JUDICATURE 298, 300 tbl.3 (1993) (reporting that Bush appeals court judges as compared to
Reagan courts of appeals judges voted in favor of criminal defendants in 20% versus 15% of
the cases, in favor of civil rights and liberties claimants in 34% versus 25% of the cases, and in
favor of unions and the economically disadvantaged in 44% versus 35% of the cases); Tomasi
& Velona, supra note 30, at 779 n.66.
41 See, e.g., C.K. Rowland & Bridget Jeffrey Todd, Where You Stand Depends on Who
Sits: Platform Promises and Judicial Gatekeeping in the Federal District Courts, 53 J. POL.
175 (1991).
42 In the 1996 presidential election, Republican challenger Bob Dole tried to make
Clinton's judicial appointments to the lower courts a key issue in his campaign. See, e.g.,
Harvey Berkman & Claudia MacLachlan, Don't Judge a Book ... Clinton's Picks-Not So
Liberal, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 21, 1996, at Al. He shouted to Republican convention delegates in
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have criticized Clinton for appointing liberal activist judges, while liberals have
questioned whether Clinton's judicial appointments have been as liberal as prior
Democratic appointees.43 The first systematic :study of circuit and district court
decisions by Clinton judges found that they indeed were not as liberal overall as
Carter judges primarily because they were more likely to vote for the government
in criminal prosecutions. 44 Clinton's circuit court appointees, however, were as
liberal as Carter's in civil rights and liberties cases, and Clinton's circuit and
district court appointees were more liberal than Republican appointees in all issue
areas.45 These appointments reflect Clinton's own centrist perspectives on many
issues, his commitment to civil rights, and his tough-on-crime rhetoric.46
August 1996, "[f]or those who say that I should not make President Clinton's liberal judicial
appointments an issue of this campaign, I have a simple response: I have heard your argument.
The motion is denied!" Naftali Bendavid, GOP Measure Chips Away at Judicial Power,
Discretion, LEGAL TIMEs, May 26, 1997, at I (quoting Dole's speech but concluding that "[t]he
issue never really caught fire during the campaign").
43 See, e.g., David Byrd, Clinton's Untilting Federal Bench, 32 NAT'L J. 555 (2000)
(describing conservative interest groups' claims as well as liberal groups' laments about Clinton
judges);
[T]he Clinton judges are an ideologically bland group. "The Clinton appointments are
philosophically moderate," says Nan Aron, the president of the liberal Alliance for Justice,
which monitors judicial appointments. "Studies show that they have the same ideological
underpinnings as Gerald Ford's appointments. They're less liberal than Jimmy Carter's."
[Deputy Attorney General] Jamie Gorelick says, "On choices of judicial candidates, the
President has often been more comfortable with the more middle-of-the-road, less
doctrinaire candidates."
Jeffrey Toobin, Clinton's Left-Hand Man, NEW YORKER, July 21, 1997, at 28, 29-30.
44 Ronald Stidham et al., The Voting Behavior of President Clinton's Judicial Appointees,
80 JUDICATURE 16, 19, 20 (1996) (reporting that Carter's circuit appointees were much more
liberal than Clinton's in criminal justice cases (40% versus 31%) though Clinton circuit judges
were still more liberal than Nixon (26%), Ford (20%), Reagan (26%), or Bush (22%) judges in
the criminal justice issue area, and that Carter's district court appointees were more liberal than
Clinton's in criminal justice cases (38% versus 34%), but again Clinton's appointees were more
liberal than Nixon's (300/6), Ford's (32%), Reagan's (23%) or Bush's (29%)).
45 Id (finding that Carter and Clinton circuitjudges were comparably liberal in civil ights
and liberties cases (42% versus 41%), an issue area in which the most liberal Republican
appointees in these cases, Ford appointees, took a liberal position 35% of the time and the most
conservative, Nixon appointees, took a liberal position 29% of the time; and reporting that
Clinton district judges were liberal in 48% of all cases compared to Nixon (39%), Ford (44%),
Reagan (36%), and Bush (37%) district judges); see also Byrd, supra note 43, at 555-56
(describing political science professor Robert Carp's study of 60,000 federal district court
opinions that produced findings strikingly parallel to those found for circuit court judges).
46 Political scientist Sheldon Goldman, an expert on judicial selection, concludes that,
"'[f]rom Clinton's perspective, he already has a legacy, and it's a pretty damn good one.' "
Carrie Johnson, Final Judgment: The President Has Been Criticized by Left and Right. Maybe
He Got the Bench He Wanted-And Deserved, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 6, 2000, at 10 (quoting
Goldman, and also quoting Victoria Radd Rollins, associate counsel to President Clinton from
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Sitting judges appointed by a president from the same party may offer an
assist to a contemporary president's efforts to influence policy by way of the
courts: These judges will time their retirement to ensure that a president from their
appointing party will name their replacement. For example, a number of Nixon
appointees retired shortly after Reagan was elected as did a number of Carter
appointees after Clinton's election.47 James Spriggs and Paul Wahlbeck found in
a comprehensive event analysis of appeals court retirements that the President's
party was statistically significantly related to a judge's retirement decision as well
as the timing of her retirement.48 Strategic retirements also support the view that a
judge's political orientation is related to the party of the President who selects her.
Presidents utilize judicial appointments as one tool to influence substantive
policy while in office as well as after they leave office. However, their ability to
take full advantage of this mechanism is affected by the work of the other political
body with direct power over the process: the Senate.
B. Senatorial Confirmation
The President must work with the Senate to appoint federal judges.49
Senators play a role in judicial selection at various stages: choosing nominees,
after nomination but before any formal Senate action, during Senate Judiciary
Committee hearings, and at the full Senate vote on a candidate. The final stage-
full Senate vote-is the most visible, but least frequently used, to influence
naming of judges.50 Most action takes place earlier in the process, often with the
threat of a negative full vote. The Senate has developed various rules and adopted
evolving norms over time, yet one feature has remained prominent: Senators
1994 to late 1995, who " 'believe[s] the president has been doing exactly what he intended and
wanted to accomplish in all these years. He nominated centrist judges who in large part reflect
his views on issues, with a deep commitment to representing women and minorities on the
bench.' ").
47 See generally Fed. Judicial Ctr., Federal Judicial Biographies Database, at
http://air.jc.gov/history/judges_frm.html (providing the means of constructing groups ofjudges
with common characteristics such as nominating president and date of retirement from active
service) (last visited Feb. 2, 2003).
48 James F. Spriggs II & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Calling It Quits: Strategic Retirement on the
Federal Courts of Appeals, 1893-1991, 48 POL. RES. Q. 573, 588 (1995); see also Deborah J.
Barrow & Gary Zuk, An InstitutionalAnalysis of Turnover in the Lower Federal Courts, 1900-
1987, 52 J. POL. 457 (1990).
49See generally DEBORAH J. BARROW ET AL., THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY AND
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (1996) (offering a history of the roles played by both branches in the
appointment process).
5 0 See WALTER F. MURPHY ET AL., COURTS, JUDGES, AND POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 144 (5th ed. 2002) (observing that outright rejection was more
common prior to the twentieth century than after, but noting that other tactics, such as delay,
have been used to thwart presidential nominations).
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frequently use their power over lower court appointments to increase their support
among voters, donors, and interest groups.
Senators, particularly from the President's party, have direct influence on the
selection of nominees to the lower federal courts through "senatorial courtesy."
Courtesy is the President's practice of consulting-with varying degrees of
deference-senators from the state with a lower court vacancy.5' The practice of
senatorial courtesy for home-state court nominations was bom in the very first
Congress and continues today.52 Thus, senators hold greater authority than their
colleagues when nominations are for seats within their home state. If a home-state
senator withholds support, the Senate is far less likely to confirm (though this
practice has varied some over time). 53 For this reason, the Administration solicits
suggestions and support from home-state senators before most court of appeals
and district court nominations.54 Finally, senators have much greater power over
appointments to district courts than to the court; of appeals, and almost no power
over appointments to specialized courts or the D.C. Circuit.55 From the very
beginning, senators appreciated the patronage potential of their Article H role in
judicial appointments and have actively used it to reward their supporters. 56
51 Id. at 139-40.
52 The Senate rejected George Washington's nomination of a well-qualified candidate for
a Georgia district judgeship because Georgia's senators wanted a different person. Washington
deferred and nominated the senators' choice the very next day. HAROLD CHASE, FEDERAL
JUDGES: THE APPOINTING PROCESS 7 (1972) (concluding that "Senators from the First Congress
on have recognized that one or two Senators have a much greater stake in a particular
appointment than others").
53 Democratic Position on Judicial Nominations: Need to Resolve Procedural Issues,
May 8, 2001, at http://www.senate.gov/~leahy/press/200105/010508.htm (describing Senate's
"blue slip" procedure whereby a home state senator returns the slip if she supports the
nomination, and withholds it if she opposes and questioning then-Chairman Orrin Hatch's
representations that the Senate would no longer require that both slips be returned in order to
recommend the candidate).
5 4 ASI-LYN K. KUERSTEN & DONALD R. SONGER, DECISIONS ON THE U.S. COURTS OF
APPEALS 70, 72 (2001) (observing that "[h]ome state senators not only identify possible
contenders for the federal bench, but they may also have a level of 'residual power'; seats on
the courts can be presumed to belong to a senator.")
5 5 See LAWRENCE BAUM, THE AMERICAN COURTS: PROCESS AND POLICY 120-21 (2d ed.
1990); ROBERT A. CARP & C.K. ROWLAND, POLICYMAKING AND POLITICS IN THE FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURTS (1983); NEIL D. MCFEELEY, APIOINTMENT OF JUDGES, THE JOHNSON
PRESIDENCY (1987); RICHARD J. RICHARDSON & KENNETH N. VINES, THE POLITICS OF
FEDERAL COURTS (1970).
56 See generally ABRAHAM, supra note 29; GOLDMAN, supra note 23. The dynamics of
senators' efforts to reward supporters responded to changes in the job of senator. Thus, senators
would be more likely to use appointments to secure support for reelection as more senators
sought reelection beginning in the late nineteenth century and were directly elected beginning in
1913.
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After the President names his choice for a lower court vacancy, senators can
voice their views by using the "blue slip."'57 The Chair of the Senate Judiciary
Committee sends a memorandum on blue paper to the senators from a nominee's
state, and each senator indicates support or opposition on the sheet and returns it
to the Chair.58 The blue-slip practice is internal to the Senate itself: The majority
party in the Senate will defer to a senator who opposes a nominee from his or her
state. When government is divided (the Senate and presidency controlled by
different parties), senators can always prevent presidential influence by refusing
to approve nominees.
The first visible participation of the Senate occurs at Judiciary Committee
hearings. The Senate created a standing Judiciary Committee on December 10,
1816, that has continuously overseen the Senate's role pursuant to its own rules of
procedure. 59 The Committee began holding confirmation hearings regularly in the
1950s, and senators more and more frequently use these to ask candidates about
their judicial philosophy.60 The live televised hearings on the ultimately
successful nomination of Clarence Thomas to replace Thurgood Marshall were
watched by millions of Americans; some likely learned for the first time the
details of the federal judicial appointment process.
The last stage for candidates is a full Senate vote. Studies of Senate
confirmation votes have found that senators consider both personal political
concerns as well as institutional ones.61 The Senate has rejected 19 of 144
Supreme Court nominees (13.2%).62 The most famous recent rejection was of
Robert Bork for the vacancy resulting from Justice Lewis Powell's retirement.63
57 See generally Brannon P. Denning, The Judicial Confirmation Process and the Blue
Slip, 85 JUDICATURE 218 (2002) (detailing the development and nature of the blue-slip
practice).
58 The Office of Legal Policy is posting the status of blue slips for Bush's nominees on its
website. See Dep't of Justice Office of Legal Policy, Blue Slips, at http://www.usdoj.gov/
olp/blueslipsl .htm (last visited on Oct. 26, 2002).
59 U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Committee History, at http://www.senate.gov/
-judiciary/history.cfin and http://www.senate.gov/-judiciary/
information.cfm/committee-rules.cfm (last visited on Nov. 9, 2002).
60 See Robert F. Nagel, Advice, Consent, and Influence, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 858, 859-60
(1990) (reviewing the historical development of Senate review of Supreme Court nominees and
arguing that a norm of active senatorial oversight has developed as was seen most vividly in the
Bork hearings).
61 Charles M. Cameron et al., Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees: A
Neoinstitutional Model, 84 AM. POL. SCi. REV. 525 (1990); Jeffrey A. Segal, Senate
Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices: Partisan and Institutional Politics, 49 J. POL. 998
(1987).
62 ABRAHAM, supra note 29, at 28.
63 The only federal court nominee to be rejected by the full Senate since Bork is Ronnie
White, the first African-American judge on Missouri's highest state court, who was nominated
by Clinton for the Eastern District of Missouri. Senators expressed concern that White was too
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Bork's nomination to the Supreme Court was doomed in part because of his
well-known staunch conservatism (reflected in his controversial scholarship and
D.C. Circuit opinions) and in part due to timing (the President's party no longer
held a Senate majority).64 The Democratic-conLtrolled Senate, fueled by interest
groups, held highly public and dramatic hearings before voting down the
nomination forty-two to fifty-eight.65
While the Senate has explicitly rejected a relatively small percentage of
judicial nominees, it has prevented the President from naming his first choice or
from filling a vacancy at all through tactics other than a negative vote. The Senate
has refused to vote on eleven Supreme Court nominees. In addition, 161 court of
appeals and 216 district court nominees failed to gain confirmation, most as a
result of Senate inaction, a negative Judiciary Committee vote without a full
Senate vote, or presidential or candidate withdrawal from consideration.66
Even considering all possible senatorial obstacles to appointment, presidents
have largely been successful in naming judges. To the extent that presidents have
failed, this has been highly con-elated with whether the President's party controls
soft on capital crimes, or as Missouri Senator John Ashcroft put it, Judge White has "a
tremendous bent toward criminal activity." Editorial, The Ronnie White Vote, WASH. POST,
Oct. 8, 1999, at A28. Some observers concluded that senators acted on the belief that black
judges vote differently from white judges-specifically that blacks on the bench would identify
with and be lenient on criminal defendants-rather than on White's voting record. See, e.g.,
Donna Britt, Judging A Nominee By the Color of His Skin?, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 1999, at B 1;
Steve Kraske & Kevin Murphy, White House Rips Rejection of Nominee, KAN. CITY STAR,
Oct. 7, 1999, at Al (reporting that the Clinton administration as well as leading civil rights
groups accused the Senate of racism in rejection); Ben White, Deepening Rif over Judge Vote,
Minorities Confirmed at a Lower Rate, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 1999, at A3 (discussing claims of
racism during the Senate confirmation process). But see Benjamin Soskis, On the Hill: White
Out, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 1, 1999, at 14 (arguing that "White's rejection wasn't the result of
racism but of another potent force: the grimy imperatives of state-level electoral politics").64 Symposium: The Bork Nomination, 9 CARDOZO L. Rv. 1 (1987); PUB. CITIZEN LrrIG.
GROUP, THE JUDICIAL RECORD OF JUDGE ROBERT H. BORK (1987); SCHWARTZ, supra note 27,
at 140.
65 MURPHY ET AL., supra note 50, at 145-46 (attributing the Senate Judiciary Committee's
energetic offensive to, among other things, Bork's "years writing and speaking on his vision of
the American constitutional system, a vision that was like Reagan's but much more detailed");
Gregory Caldeira & John Wright, Lobbying For Justice, 42 AM. J. POL. SCi. 499 (1998)
(describing the dramatic increase in interest group participation in judicial nominations since the
contentious Bork battle).
66 Wendy L. Martinek et al., To Advise and Consent: The Senate and Lower Federal
Court Nominations, 1977-1998, 64 J. POL. 337, 339 (2002) (reporting numbers through the
Clinton administration); Nominations Statistics, supra note 10 (reporting negative committee
votes on two Bush nominees).
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the Senate. 67 The next subsection considers whether partisan tension actually
increases the probability of an independent judiciary.
C. Divided Government
What are the effects of divided government on judicial selection? The federal
government is divided when one party controls the executive and the other
controls the relevant house(s) of the legislature.68 Different parties have
controlled the two Article II powers in just over half of the last fifty years.69 Some
scholars have contended that unified government is a prerequisite to legislative
action, otherwise the branches will be deadlocked. 70 However, substantial
evidence exists that split party control does not prevent the adoption of major
legislative initiatives.71 Likewise, many have complained that party antagonism
between the President and the Senate undermines judicial selection. But, the
67 Garland W. Allison, Delay in Senate Confirmation of Federal Judicial Nominees, 80
JUDICATURE 8 (1996) (reporting that district court nominees were confirmed 77% of the time
when the Senate was controlled by the opposing party compared to 90% of the time when the
Senate was controlled by the president's party, and that circuit court nominees were confirmed
72% of the time versus 87% of the time); Jeffrey Segal & Harold Spaeth, If a Supreme Court
Vacancy Occurs, Will the Senate Confirm a Reagan Nominee?, 69 JUDICATURE 188, 188
(1986) (finding that prior to Reagan, only 59% of Supreme Court nominees were confirmed
when the Senate was controlled by the opposing party as compared to 89% when controlled by
the president's party).
68 MORRIs FIORINA, DIVIDED GOVERNMENT (2d ed. 1996); James A. Thurber,
Representation, Accountability, and Efficiency in Divided Party Control of Government, 24 PS:
POL. SCI. & POL. 653, 653 (1991).
69 The Senate and president were divided from 1955 to 1961, 1969 to 1977, 1987 to 1993,
from 1995 to January 20, 2001, and June 6, 2001 to January 6, 2003. United States Senate,
Senate Statistics, at http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one item-and-teasers/
partydiv.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2003); see also Intemet Public Library, POTUS: Presidents of
the United States, at http://www.ipl.org/div/potus/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2003).
70 See, e.g., Sean Kelly, Divided We Govern: A Reassessment, 25 POLITY 475 (1993)
(presenting empirical evidence that divided governments are statistically significantly less likely
to pass major legislation); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Taking Advice Seriously: An Immodest
Proposal for Reforming the Confirmation Process, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1577, 1581-82 (1992)
(arguing that although the Framers "undoubtedly intended the process of selection and
confirmation by the political branches as a check upon potential judicial tyrants, [they] almost
certainly did not intend the process to be as heavily politicizid and partisan as it has become.");
James L. Sundquist, Needed: A Political Theory for the New Era of Coalition Government in
the United States, 103 POL. SCI. Q. 613, 616-24 (1988-89) (criticizing divided government as
inefficient and reckless).
71 See, e.g., DAVID R. MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE GOVERN: PARTY CONTROL, LAWMAKING,
AND INVESTIGATIONS, 1946-1990 ch. 4 (1991); see also FIORINA, supra note 68, at 158-77
(reviewing various studies).
2003]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
conflict between a divided Senate and president may increase the probability of
relatively nonpartisan judges.72
Divided government enhances the role of divided authority in judicial
appointment. The constitutional separation of powers between the legislature and
the executive together with split party control of the two branches acts as a check
on abuse of power by one branch and encourages compromise. Neither branch
wishes to take the blame for gridlock, thus each must demonstrate some effort to
reach outcomes. In the appointment of judges, the effect is to induce presidents to
seek senatorial input prior to nomination and to encourage senators to move
quickly and favorably on judges named after this input.
Political scientist Nancy Scherer has challenged the idea that divided
government undermines the ability of the President to choose lower court judges
who match his ideology.73 She examined search and seizure, race discrimination,
and federalism decisions of circuit judges appointed by Reagan and Clinton in
which a dissent was filed or that reversed the lower court.74 During the period of
her study (1994-1998), she found that divided government was not statistically
significantly related to the ideological direction of the judges' votes. 75
I found different results in an examination of en banc decisions in the Fourth
and Eighth circuits. Unlike Scherer's study, mine does not control for other
factors influencing decisions. But, my data have the advantage of including more
presidential appointments and more issue areas. Twenty-seven Fourth Circuit and
eighteen Eighth Circuit judges participated in at least ten en banc decisions within
their respective circuits from 1956 through 1996.76 Eighteen were appointed
during divided government. 77 The party of the appointing president was not a
statistically significant explanation for the votes of thirteen of those eighteen
judges. By contrast, the President's party was significant for twenty-four out of
72 Senator Paul Simon, in an article emphasizing the importance of the Senate in judicial
selection, hypothesized that divided government may produce moderate candidates. Paul
Simon, The Senate's Role in Judicial Appointments, 70 JUDICATURE 55, 58 (1986); see also
Charles Black, A Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court Nominees, 79 YALE L.J.
657 (1970).
73 Nancy Scherer, Who Drives the Ideological Makeup of the Lower Federal Courts in a
Divided Government?, 35 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 191 (2001).
74 She also included district judges sitting by designation. Id. at 195.
75 Id. at 207-14.
76 For a full discussion of Fourth Circuit decisions and the data from which the Fourth
Circuit results are drawn, see Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of
Decisionmaking on US. Courts ofAppeals, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1635 (1998).
77 Eleven of the Fourth Circuit judges were appointed during divided government
(Eisenhower named three, Nixon four, and George H.W. Bush four) as were seven of the
Eighth Circuit judges (Nixon appointed two, Ford one, Reagan one, and Bush three). Fed.
Judicial Ctr., Judges of the United States Courts, at http://air.ftc.gov/history/judges~frm.htm
(last visited Feb. 2,2003).
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twenty-seven judges appointed during unified government. The table below sets
forth these results.
Table 2. Presidential Success in Appointment During Divided Versus Unified




Presidential Significant 5 24 29
Party Not Significant 13 3 16
Total 18 27 45
Note: Table includes only those judges who participated in at least ten en banc
decisions during the period of study. Presidential party was considered a statistically
significant explanation ofjudges' votes if p < .05 in a bivariate logistic regression.
While many factors may account for the unexplained judges, 78 unified
government is highly correlated with the ability of presidents to name judges who
match their policy views on a consistent basis in this set of cases. And this result
is intuitive. When the President's party controls the Senate, the Administration
may meet privately with Senate leaders to negotiate over nominees thereby
ensuring the selection of judges who most closely match the ruling party's
perspectives as well as their rapid confirmation. Moreover, unified government
limits the role of opposing interest groups in judicial selection by denying them
access to key decisionmakers and curtailing the public portion of the Article II
process.79
Divided government has been blamed for a slowdown in the appointment of
judges to such a degree that the judicial system is threatened.80 Several highly
publicized disputes are cited in support of this view; however, the full range of
evidence supports only a weaker claim.81 As more members of the Judiciary
78 For the en banc cases in this study, the party of the president failed to explain the
decisions of all three Eisenhower appointments to the Fourth Circuit. No Eisenhower
appointees were in the Eighth Circuit data.
79 See Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Lobbying for Justice: The Rise of
Organized Conflict in the Politics of Federal Judgeships, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 44, 51-
59, 65 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995) (analyzing the increased involvement of interest groups in
judicial appointments and the effects of divided government generally as well as under certain
presidents).
80 Task Force on Fed. Judicial Selection, Justice Held Hostage: Politics and Selecting
Federal Judges: The Report of the Citizens for Independent Courts, in UNCERTAIN JUSTICE:
PoLrlcs AND AMERICA'S CouRTs 1, 21-25 (2000).
81 FIORINA, supra note 68, at 97 (observing that "[i]nclusive of Justice Thomas, Presidents
have named twenty-four justices since World War II, nine in unified government years and
20031
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
Committee are from the opposing party, judicial nominees are less likely to be
confirmed and take longer to wend their way through the process as reflected in
Table 3.
Table 3. The Effect of Divided Government on Average Number of Days to Final
Senate Action on District and Circuit Court Nominees, 1977-1998
Successful Unsuccessful All
Nominees Nominees Nominees
Unified Government 59 (674) 103 (66) 63
Divided Government 121(444) 238(135) 148
Source: Based on data reported in Task Force on Federal Judicial Selection, supra note
80, at 60 tbl. 12 (prepared by the Michigan State University Program for Law and
Judicial Politics and Wendy Martinek under the direction of Harold Spaeth).
Note: "Final Senate Action" is confirmation for successful nominees and for
unsuccessful nominees is rejection, withdrawal, or return to the President at the end of a
congressional term without decision. The figure in parentheses is the number of
nominees in each category. Renominations are included.
An extensive study by political scientists Wendy Martinek, Mark Kemper,
and Steven Van Winkle, however, indicates that other factors have nearly as
much influence (or more) on the time it takes for the Senate to decide on district
and circuit nominees as relative party in power.82 As an initial matter, presidents
must wait longer for Senate action on nominees submitted in later years of their
term in office83 or made in their second term as compared to their first term.84
The Senate also moves more slowly on district court designees when presidential
approval is low or the Judiciary Committee is controlled by the other party.85
Divided government was not a statistically significant factor in the length of time
fifteen in divided years. Four nominations offered during times of divided control were
unsuccessful ... , as compared to two offered during times of unified control ...
82 Martinek et al., supra note 66.
83 A comparison of the average number of days between nomination and final Senate
action (defined as confirmation, return of nomination, or withdrawal) for each half of a
presidential term: Carter (38 versus 90), Reagan 1 (32 versus 38), Reagan 11 (45 versus 144),
Bush (78 versus 138), Clinton 1 (83 versus 159), and Clinton 11 (201 versus more than 247
days). See Task Force on Fed. Judicial Selection, supra note 80, at 40-41 tbl.l (reporting
figures for Carter through the first half of Clinton 1I); Sheldon Goldman et al., supra note 11, at
235 (reporting that the average number of days between nomination and holding a hearing for
confirmed judges was 247 days in Clinton's last two years and that many Clinton nominees
waited for longer than that period without any Senate action).
84 Martinek et al., note 66, at 354 tbl.6 (reporting the results of a duration analysis that
includes multiple independent variables); id. at 356 fig.5 (representing the relationship between
presidential year and term and confirmation duration).
85 Id. at 354 tbl. 6.
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to decision on circuit candidates. Nominee characteristics also affect confirmation
duration: Higher ABA ratings decrease the length of time for circuit and district
nominees, while minority status, but not gender, increases the length of time for
district nominees.
Divided government is not a panacea for the problems of political
appointments. First, Scherer's study casts doubt on the long-held belief that the
Senate can temper an opposing president's efforts to name partisan judges. Her
work certainly requires a further examination of the appointments of other
presidents during divided government and the decisions of more judges. Second,
divided government may demand greater resources in judicial selection than is
merited by any resulting moderation in judicial behavior. As the next section
explains, life-tenured judges may inevitably reach decisions based on the political
perspectives that brought them to the attention of elected officials.
III. IDEOLOGICAL DECISIONMAKING
Federal judges face few limitations on their ability to act in a partisan fashion.
The Constitution's structural protections insulate judges from the electoral
process, but they do little to constrain judges. In fact, Article III allows individuals
to defer entirely to ideological preferences-simply personal ones, rather than
populist ones. The most meaningful restriction on judges is the authority of those
above them in the judicial hierarchy. But, today, the likelihood of meaningful
review by a higher court is so low that the threat of reversal seems a weak
restraint on lower courts.86
Federal judges are therefore free to maximize their goals or preferences (or at
least try to do so).87 Judicial preferences likely include a desire to issue opinions
86 The federal judicial system is a distorted pyramid today: the district courts terminated
nearly 600,000 cases in the October 2000 term compared to 28,840 merit terminations in the
circuit courts, and 197 terminations in the Supreme Court (82 in full opinions and 115 in
memoranda). Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Business of the United States Courts
2001, tbls.A-1, B-I, C-1, C-2, at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2001/contents.html (last
visited Feb. 2, 2003). Even if a district court's ruling is reviewed by the court of appeals, it is
likely to be affirmed: more than 90% are affirmed. Id. at B-5. And, circuit judges know that
even though the Supreme Court is more likely to reverse than affirm, the Court agrees to hear
fewer than 4% of paid petitions seeking review. Supreme Court, 2000 Term: The Statistics, 115
HARV. L. REv. 539, 546 (2001).
87 See generally LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998)
(offering and testing a strategic actor model of justices); Sheldon Goldman, Backgrounds,
Attitudes and the Voting Behavior of Judges: A Comment on Joel Grossman's Social
Backgrounds and Judicial Decisions, 31 J. POL. 214 (1969) (considering possible explanations
for lower court judges' decisions); Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Seek to
Maximize? (The Same Things Everybody Els-e Does), 3 Sup. CT. ECON. REv. 1 (1993)
(providing a rational choice theory of judicial behavior). But see Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the
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that are well thought of by peers, affirmed by higher courts, and followed by other
courts. Hence, judges would seek to issue decisions that are consistent with
widely accepted legal doctrine and stare decisis. Of course, the law often grants
judges a fair degree of discretion to reach more than one conclusion.88 Judges
with greater freedom are less constrained by legal doctrine. The lower the court in
the judicial hierarchy and the fewer the limits on its caseload, the less autonomous
the judge. District courts are the lowest tier of the federal judicial system and hear
the largest number of cases. Not surprisingly, then, district court studies have
found that legal factors account for most district court rulings, although a small
group of close cases are sensitive to extralegal factors.89 Because a greater
percentage of courts of appeals decisions, and nearly all Supreme Court cases,
allow leeway, studies demonstrate that the law provides only a partial account of
appellate rulings.90
Judges, in exercising their discretion, will want to issue a decision consistent
with their personal normative conceptions of public policy and rights. The
ideological direction ("liberal" or "conservative") of the party of a judge's
appointing president is a strong predictor of the case votes of justices on the
Supreme Court91 and judges on Courts of Appeals.92 Democratic judges are more
Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 777 (2001) (demonstrating experimentally that cognitive
illusions can prevent judges from reaching rational decisions).
88 Task Force on Fed. Judicial Selection, supra note 80, at 15 (observing that "[ijn our
postrealist age, we know that legal materials may well be somewhat indeterminate or
conflicting, and that judges often invoke background normative notions in deciding how to
rule").
89 ROBERT A. CARP & C. K. ROWLAND, POLICYMAKING AND POLrrIcs IN THE FEDERAL
DIsTRiCr COURTS 165 (1983) (arguing, based on extensive empirical research, that for close
cases or those presenting new issues, non-legal factors explain district court outcomes); Orley
Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case
Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 281 (1995) (concluding that in most district court cases "the
law--not the judge-dominates the outcomes. Judges may treat most cases as ones in which
political interests are irrelevant or cannot change the outcome. In the select few cases that are
appealed or lead to published opinions, individual judges have a greater role in shaping
outcomes."); Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind. An Empirical
Study ofJudicialReasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1377, 1465-70 (1998).
90 See generally Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court
Decision Making, 86 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 323 (1992); Jeffrey A. Segal, Predicting Supreme
Court Cases Probabilistically: The Search and Seizure Cases, 1962-1981, 78 AM. POL. ScI.
REV. 891 (1984); Donald R. Songer & Susan Haire, Integrating Alternative Approaches to the
Study of Judicial Voting: Obscenity Cases in the US. Courts of Appeals, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI.
963 (1992).
91 See, e.g., STUART S. NAGEL, THE LEGAL PROCESs FROM A BEHAVIORAL PERSPECrIVE
(1969); JOHN D. SPRAGUE, VOTING PATTERNS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: CASES
IN FEDERALISM 1889-1959 (1968) (examining voting blocs using algorithm pairing justices
who vote together); George & Epstein, supra note 90, at 329-30 (finding that "the addition of
Republican appointees enhanced the Court's propensity toward a law-and-order stance"); Stuart
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likely than Republican judges to cast a liberal vote in cases where they have some
decisionmaking discretion.93 For example, in the areas of civil rights and liberties,
Democratic judges generally seek to extend those freedoms, Republicans to limit.
In the realm of economic regulation, Democratic jurists favor an enhanced
governmental role in the economy and tend to uphold legislation that benefits
working people or the economic underdog, while Republicans oppose an increase
in government intervention and tend to favor business. In criminal cases,
Democratic judges generally are more sympathetic to criminal defendants, while
Republicans tend to favor prosecution and law enforcement. The categorizations
are admittedly broad and cannot account for the complexity of relative ideological
positions. Yet, they reveal that the ideology of the appointing president is
consistently correlated with judicial rulings, and that the relationship is stronger
for the higher (and more powerful) courts. Thus, the nonelected judiciary behaves
S. Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and Judges'Decisions, 55 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 843 (1961);
C. Neal Tate, Personal Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior of US. Supreme Court
Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economics Decisions, 1946-1978, 75 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 355 (1981) (demonstrating that the ideology of the appointing president had a strong
influence on justices' decisions in civil liberties, civil rights and economic cases).
92 See, e.g., James J. Brudney et al., Judicial Hostility Toward Labor Unions?: Applying
the Social Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1675, 1715 tbl.ll
(1999) (finding that Democratic circuit court appointees were much more likely than
Republican appointees to favor unions); Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial
Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of
Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2175-76 (1998); George, supra note 76, at 1678-86
(demonstrating that the majority of Fourth Circuit judges participating in en banc cases between
1962 and 1996 voted their sincere policy preferences as measured by the party of their
appointing president); Jon Gottschall, Reagan's Appointments to the US. Courts of Appeals:
The Continuation of a Judicial Revolution, 70 JUDICATURE 48, 54 (1986) (finding that Reagan
appointees to the circuit bench were more conservative than Democratic appointees and
comparably conservative when compared to previous Republican appointees); Stidham et al.,
supra note 44, at 17, 20 (finding that Clinton appointees were more liberal than Republican
appointees but less than Carter appointees); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation,
Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REv. 1717, 1719 (1997); cf. Susan Brodie Haire et al.,
Attorney Expertise, Litigant Success, and Judicial Decisionmaking in the US. Courts of
Appeals, 33 LAw & SoC'Y REv. 667, 679-80, 681 Table 4 (1999) (utilizing an ideological
classification scale where circuit judges "appointed by a conservative ideology-conscious
president [were] coded -1 ... , those appointed by a president who was not ideology conscious
[were] coded 0 ... , and those appointed by liberal ideology-conscious presidents [were] coded
+ I .. ." and concluding that ideology was significantly related to products liability decisions).
93 For examples of data sets utilizing these distinctions between liberal and conservative
judicial behavior, see Donald R. Songer, United States Courts of Appeals Database Phase 1,
1925-1988 (1998), at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/index.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2003)
(subscription site); Harold J. Spaeth, United States Supreme Court Judicial Database, 1953-
1997 Terms (1999), at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/index.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2003)
(subscription site); Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and Judges' Decisions, supra note 91, at
845.
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similarly to the elected branches, although the degree of partisanship is certainly
less.
Judges in some instances behave consistently with the overt policy statements
of presidents. The effect should not be as strong for lower court judges as
Supreme Court justices. 94 But, a relationship between appointing president and
district judge behavior is clear. Nixon, for example, wanted assurances that
nominees would take a law-and-order stance and support business interests.
Nixon trial judges are significantly more conservative on economic matters and
defendants' rights than their predecessors. 95 Reagan appointees are even more
conservative than Nixon as well as Carter judges on criminal issues. 96 And, the
relationship is more than simply a party relationship: The particular policy goals
of a president are reflected in the decisions of his appointees. 97
IV. DESIRE FOR PROMOTION
It would be surprising if federal judges, individuals who have undoubtedly
been driven by ambition nearly all of their lives, stopped striving for greater levels
of achievement once appointed. Even Supreme Court justices have been known
to have ambition for other offices. James Bymes left the Court in 1942 and Arthur
Goldberg in 1964 for executive branch posts.98 Other justices did not leave the
Court but were known to be interested in the possibility: Both Justices William 0.
Douglas and Hugo Black, as well as others undoubtedly, expressed an interest in
94 CARP & ROWLAND, supra note 89, at 165.
95 C. K. Rowland & Robert A. Carp, Presidential Effects on Federal District Court Policy
Decisions: Economic Liberalism, 1960-1977, 64 Soc. Sci. Q. 386 (1983); C. K. Rowland &
Robert A. Carp, The Relative Effects of Maturation, Time Period, and Appointing President on
District Judges' Policy Choices, 5 POL. BEHAV. 109 (1983); C. K. Rowland et al., Judges'
Policy Choices and the Value Basis of Judicial Appointments: A Comparison of Support for
Criminal Defendants Among Nixon, Johnson, and Kennedy Appointees to the Federal District
Courts, 46 J. POL. 886 (1984).
96 C.K. Rowland et al., Presidential Effects on Criminal Justice Policy in the Lower
Federal Courts: The Reagan Judges, 22 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 191 (1988).
97 KEvIN L. LYLES, THE GATEKEEPERS: FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS IN THE POLITICAL
PROCESS (1997); Steve Alumbaugh & C. K. Rowland, The Links Between Platform-Based
Appointment Criteria and Trial Judges' Abortion Judgments, 74 JUDICATURE 153 (1990);
Randall D. Lloyd, Separating Partisanship from Party in Judicial Research: Reapportionment
in the US. District Courts, 89 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 413 (1995); Rowland & Todd, supra note
41. 98 For detailed biographical information about every federal judge, see Fed. Judicial Ctr.,
Judges of the United States Courts, at http://www.jc.gov/history/home.nsf (last visited Feb. 2,
2003).
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the presidency/vice-presidency. 99 Lower court judges likely aspire to appointment
to a higher court, and this desire may affect their decisions.
Presidents have on occasion named individuals to the court of appeals or
district court as a preliminary step in their ultimate appointment to a higher court.
Presidents may do this to increase the likelihood that a person will be confirmed
for the higher-and more influential--post. A political insider may be more
palatable to the Senate if he or she has demonstrated moderation during service
on a lower court. Presidents may also use the lesser appointment as a way to
confirm the judicial behavior of a nominee before promoting him or her to a more
valuable position. David Yalof, in his study of executive branch judicial
nomination politics, concludes that lower courts can serve as a "proving ground"
for potential Supreme Court nominees. 100
During most of their existence, the courts of appeals have provided a
significant number of Supreme Court justices.10 1 In the past fifty years, thirteen of
twenty-one justices previously served on the circuit bench. Seven of the current
justices came from the circuits. Appeals court judges may know the odds of high
court appointment are long, but many undoubtedly aspire to it (knowing that they
have beaten the odds in their appointment to one of the few circuit seats). And,
these judges know that the Supreme Court nomination and confirmation
processes will include a close consideration of their judicial record by the
Executive, the Senate, and increasing numbers of interest groups.102 Herbert
Hoover's 1930 Supreme Court nomination of Fourth Circuit Chief Judge John
Parker was derailed in part by labor groups that took issue with a Parker opinion
9 9 RIcHARD DAVIS, DECISIONS AND IMAGES: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESS 128
(1994) (arguing that O'Connor was interested in the vice-presidency); Lawrence Baum,
Recruitment and the Motivations of Supreme Court Justices, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-
MAKING: NEW INSTrrUTIONALIST APPROACHES 202, 204 (Comell W. Clayton & Howard
Gillman eds., 1999).
100 YALOF, supra note 25, at 14.
101 Daniel Klerman, Nonpromotion and Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 455,
461 (1999) (reporting that since 1940 at least 40% of Supreme Court nominations have been
appeals court judges). The Evarts Act of 1891 created the circuit courts of appeals, but they
looked very different from today's circuits because they lacked sufficient judges to fill a three-
judge panel (relying instead on judges from the district courts to assist) and they heard only a
small number of cases and were the final word in an even smaller number. The increase in the
number of circuit judges in 1911 and the expansion of the Supreme Court's certiorari power in
1925, along with a rise in caseload, produced the modem courts of appeals. Tracey E. George,
The Dynamics and Determinants of the Decision to Grant En Banc Review, 74 WASH. L. REV.
213,221-26 (1999).
102 For example, Ford's aides carefully read every circuit opinion of the two finalists for
the seat vacated by Douglas-circuit judges Arlin Adams and John Paul Stevens-and
recommended Stevens over Adams. ABRAHAM, supra note 29, at 274-75. Stevens' decisions
from the High Court have been markedly more liberal than his Republican supporters expected
based on his circuit rulings.
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upholding yellow-dog contracts.10 3 Parker's subsequent fifteen years on the
Fourth Circuit were marked by more moderate decisions that earned him respect
in Democratic as well as Republican circles, prompting the Truman
Administration to reconsider (but ultimately reject) Parker for a Supreme Court
vacancy. 104
District judges comprised between 40 and 60% of court of appeals
appointments in the last century. 105 Because there are almost four times as many
district judges as circuit judges, the likelihood that any individual district judge
would be promoted is relatively low, estimated by one study to be 6% during the
Nineties. 10 6 Yet, anecdotal evidence as well as empirical studies of judicial
behavior suggest that many district judges aspire to promotion to the courts of
appeals. 107 Those who aspire may limit their behavior to prevent a possible
challenge to their promotion or to appeal to those with the power to ensure
promotion. 08
Judges who hope to be promoted have reason to believe that their rulings, at
least in visible cases, will affect their chances of success. 109 For example, the
Senate never confirmed Clinton's nomination of North Carolina District Judge
James A. Beaty, Jr., to the Fourth Circuit bench despite the fact that Clinton
nominated him twice and Beaty would have been the first African-American to sit
on the circuit. One factor cited by senators opposed to Beaty's elevation was his
decision, while a designated district judge on a Fourth Circuit panel, to sign on to
103 The decision was United Mine Workers of Am. v. Red Jacket Consol. Coal & Coke
Co., 18 F.2d 839 (1927). See ABRAHAM, supra note 29, at 30-31 (observing that civil rights
groups also opposed Parker based on evidence that he was a racist); Richard L. Watson, Jr., The
Defeat of Judge Parker: A Study in Pressure Groups and Politics, 50 Miss. VALLEY HIST. REV.
213 (1963).
104 ABRAHAM, supra note 29, at 31 (noting that following his rejection, Parker issued
numerous pro-civil rights rulings); YALOF, supra note 25, at 23-24 & n.18. See generally
WILLIAM C. BURRIS, DUTY AND THE LAW: JUDGE JOHN J. PARKER AND THE CONSTrrUTION
(1987).
105 Klerman, supra note 101, at 460.
106 Id. at 461.
107 Id. at 463 (observing that "[I]awyers are often heard to say that a particular ruling
reflects the fact that the judge is 'gunning for the circuit'" and that "[w]hile the average
probability of promotion is relatively low, particular judges may perceive it as higher."); see
also Mark A. Cohen, Explaining Judicial Behavior or What's "Unconstitutional" About the
Sentencing Commission?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 183, 188-89 (1991); RICHARD A. POSNER,
OVERCOMING LAW 111-12 (1995).
108 Cf Cohen, supra note 107, at 192-95 (finding that federal judges who were more
likely to be promoted were also more likely to vote to uphold the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines and to impose harsher penalties in antitrust cases).
109 See, e.g., GOLDMAN, supra note 23, at 305-006 (detailing conservative interest group
challenges to the elevation of District Judge Joel Flaum to the Seventh Circuit based on his
rulings in class action suits and other "bleeding heart" behavior).
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a unanimous panel ruling that granted a habeas petition." 0 And, as discussed
earlier, Bush nominee Pickering was challenged based in part on his decisions on
the district bench, and Hoover nominee Parker based on one appeals court
opinion. More than 250 published district court opinions written by one,
ultimately successful, nominee to the Seventh Circuit were reviewed by the
Administration prior to his nomination. I I
V. CONCLUSION
Judicial election critics denounce the partisanship that results, indeed is
required for election; however, life tenure does not ensure nonpartisanship. As
already discussed, presidents nominate individuals with ties and support from
within the president's party while senators seek to serve their own constituents or
ideals in confirming nominees. Judicial selection accordingly is inherently
political and not strictly merit-based. Politicized selection is likely to produce
relatively more political decisionmakers, and it does. Moreover, the autonomy of
federal judges as well as their personal ambition may also prevent them from
reaching decisions free from bias. Voters do not determine the tenure of federal
judges; nevertheless, Article Im jurists may behave in partisan ways that call into
question the value of insulation from the democratic process.
Yet, Article M protections may offer the best means of selecting relatively
impartial and competent judges. Article IlH creates the aura of legitimacy that is
crucial to the success of adjudication. In addition, other factors, such as interest
group monitoring, collegial courts, and workload, may ensure outcomes that
remain within an acceptable range of possible decisions, thereby limiting the
effects of partisanship. Finally, the current system creates countervailing pressures
that may do the most to limit the role of ideology. The federal judicial system has
its flaws, but no other human dispute resolution system is obviously better.
110 Debra Baker, Waiting and Wondering, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1999, at 52.
111 GOLDMAN, supra note 23, at 306.
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